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IS STANDING LAW OR POLITICS?
RICHARD 3. PIERCE, JR.*

Many students of the law suspect that something other than blackletter legal doctrines are affecting the outcomes of cases. Political
scientists, on the other hand, look unabashedly to the ideological
and political leanings of the judiciary as an indicator. In this
Article, Professor Richard Pierce applies recent scholarship on
judicial decisionmaking to the doctrine of standing. He reviews
five recent Supreme Court standing cases supporting the validity
of the political approach, followed by a statistical analysis of
circuit court standing cases. In light of the development of the
modern law of standing, Professor Pierce then suggests ways to
make standinga legal doctrine instead of a politicalone.
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INTRODUCTION

Standing law answers the question of who can obtain access to
the courts. The law of standing can be described in at least two ways.
A lawyer would describe it with reference to legal doctrines: A
plaintiff has standing to sue a defendant if the defendant caused the
plaintiff to suffer a legally cognizable and judicially redressable injury,
and the plaintiff is asserting an interest within the zone of interests
arguably protected or regulated by the statute that is the basis for the
plaintiff's complaint on the merits.' A political scientist, however,
would describe the "law" of standing using a completely different
frame of reference. To a political scientist, standing depends on the
degree of congruence between the political and ideological goals of
the plaintiff and those of the judges who answer the standing
question.' A political scientist would predict, for instance, that a
liberal judge would give standing to environmentalists, employees,
and prisoners, but not to banks, while a conservative judge would give
standing to banks, but not to environmentalists, employees, or
prisoners. A political scientist would find the lawyer's doctrinallybased description of standing law humorous? To a political scientist,
legal doctrines are merely tools that judges use to further their
political and ideological agendas.
As a lawyer and a law professor, I would like to be able to
describe and to teach standing with reference to legal doctrines. The
Supreme Court is making that task increasingly difficult. When I
teach an area of law, one of my primary goals is to provide law
students with a means of predicting the decisions of courts. Thus, for
instance, I would like to introduce them to the doctrinal elements of
standing law-injury, causation, redressability, and zone of
interests-and to provide them with a doctrinal algorithm that they
can use to predict judicial decisions with a reasonable degree of
confidence. Unfortunately, I have concluded that I would be doing
them a grave disservice if I took that traditional legal approach in
teaching the law of standing. They can predict judicial decisions in
this area with much greater accuracy if they ignore doctrine and rely
entirely on a simple description of the law of standing that is rooted in
political science: judges provide access to the courts to individuals
1. For a detailed discussion of standing law, see 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS &
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 16.1-.16 (3d ed. 1994).
2. See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate InterdisciplinaryIgnorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 253 (1997).
3. See id. at 264.
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who seek to further the political and ideological agendas of judges.
Of course, I still must introduce my students to the doctrines courts
use to rationalize their political decisions. I can teach the doctrines,
however, only as a vocabulary lesson. The doctrinal elements of
standing are nearly worthless as a basis for predicting whether a judge
will grant individuals with differing interests access to the courts.
Five Supreme Court decisions issued between 1991 and 1998
illustrate the accuracy of the political scientist's description of the law
of standing. In those cases, the Court resolved standing disputes6
5
4
applicable to environmentalists (two cases), employees, prisoners,
and banks.7 In each case, the Justices divided either five-to-four or
six-to-three on the standing issue. In each case, the "votes" of the
Justices were as easy to predict as the votes of their ideological
counterparts in the legislature.8 Liberals voted to grant access to the
courts to environmentalists, employees, and prisoners, but not to
banks. Conservatives voted to grant access to banks, but not to
environmentalists, employees, or prisoners. Of course, in each case,
all the Justices claimed to reach their politically preferred result
through objective application of legal doctrines. The applicable
doctrines are so malleable, however, that it is impossible to avoid the
inference that the Justices manipulated the doctrines to rationalize
their politically preferred results.9 Circuit courts are increasingly
following the Supreme Court's lead in this area of law. 10
In Part I of this Article, I describe the political scientist's method
of explaining and predicting judicial decisions and the growing body
of scholarly writing in which political scientists test their resultoriented hypotheses. In Part II, I describe and critique the five recent
Supreme Court decisions that support the political scientist's
approach and refute the lawyer's approach to explaining and
predicting judicial decisions that grant or deny access to the courts.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 70-75, 100-02 (discussing Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Environment, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998)); infra text accompanying notes 61-69, 9499 (discussing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 76-82, 103-06 (discussing Air Courier
Conference of America v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517 (1991)).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 49-60, 92-95 (discussing Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343 (1996)).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 83-89, 107-11 (discussing National Credit Union
Administration v. FirstNationalBank & Trust Co., 118 S. Ct. 927 (1998) ("NCUA")).
8. For a discussion of the votes in the cases, see infra notes 90-91 and accompanying

text.
9. For a discussion of the malleability of the doctrines, see infra text accompanying
notes 92-127.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 112-23.
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In Part III, I report the results of an empirical study of all circuit court

decisions issued between January 1, 1993, and May 1, 1998, in which a
court decided whether an environmental petitioner had standing.
Republican judges denied standing to environmental petitioners
almost four times as often as did Democratic judges. That pattern of
decisionmaking demonstrates the high degree of doctrinal
malleability and result-oriented doctrinal manipulation that
characterizes modern standing law. Part IV provides a brief historical
overview of standing law and questions the textual, historical, and
prudential bases for much of the modern law of standing. In Part V, I
suggest a variety of ways of changing the doctrines that govern
standing that have the potential to make standing part of the legal
system, rather than a part of the political system that happens to be
implemented by life-tenured politicians who wear robes. I conclude
with an optimistic postscript.
I. A POLITICAL SCIENTIST'S PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
DECISIONMAKING

In a 1997 article in Northwestern Law Review," Frank Cross
urged legal scholars to become familiar with, and to grapple with, the
rapidly growing body of empirical research on judicial
decisionmaking published by political scientists. These researchers
use a wide variety of databases to test the hypothesis that judicial
decisionmaking is entirely a function of each judge's political and
ideological perspective-what Cross calls "the attitudinal model.'12
Cross described and critiqued this body of work. Not surprisingly, he
identified methodological, contextual, and interpretive problems that
limit the explanatory and predictive value of the research that
supports the validity of the attitudinal model.'3 He concluded that the
attitudinal model has much greater predictive power in some
contexts, for example Supreme Court interpretations of the
Constitution, than in others, such as district court resolutions of
14
contract disputes.

Even after he subjected the studies of political scientists to a
rigorous critique, Cross concluded that the attitudinal model has
considerable explanatory and predictive power. 5 He offered credible
and well-supported findings that the attitudinal model can explain
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See Cross, supra note 2, at 252-54.
Id. at 252.
See idt at 265-309.
See idt at 285-94.
See idt at 309.
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and predict as much as 90% of judicial decisionmaking in important
contexts, 6 such as constitutional law, and that the attitudinal model
has about twice the explanatory and predictive power of the
doctrinally based legal model in the same contexts. 7 Cross also
determined that administrative law is a context in which the
attitudinal model is particularly easy to test, and in which it has
unusually strong explanatory and predictive power.'"
A few legal scholars have analyzed and tested the attitudinal
model in the administrative law context. In a 1995 article in Duke
Law Journal,9 Sidney Shapiro and Richard Levy analyzed the
political science studies of the attitudinal model and concluded that
the studies support instead a two-part model of judicial behavior. 20 In
their model, all judicial decisions have two components-"craft" and
"outcome."'" Ceteris paribus, all judges prefer an outcome that
coincides with their political and ideological preferences; at the same
time, all judges also prefer to write an opinion that evidences good
craftsmanship, an opinion that relies on accurate description and
application of precedents and doctrines. In many cases, of course,
there is no tension between a judge's craft and outcome preferences.
When the two conflict, however, Shapiro and Levy concluded that
judicial behavior will depend on two variables. First, a judge is more
likely to choose outcome over craft in a public law context with
significant ideological implications than in a private law context that
does not raise controversial public policy issues. 2 Second, a judge is
more likely to choose outcome over craft in a decisionmaking context
in which the applicable doctrines are relatively indeterminate.?' It
follows that judges are particularly likely to choose outcome over
craft in administrative law decisionmaking, and that the Supreme
Court can have a powerful effect on judges' choices between craft and
outcome by announcing administrative law doctrines with varying
degrees of determinacy. The Shapiro and Levy model captures the
results of the many political science studies of judicial decisionmaking
better than any other model that has been suggested to date. It also
has been corroborated by two recent studies of judicial
16. See id.at 310.
17. See id. at 275.
18. See id. at 293-94.
19. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, JudicialIncentives and Indeterminacy
in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions,44 DUKE L.J. 1051 (1995).
20. See id. at 1053.
21. Id. at 1053-56.
22- See id. at 1056-58.
23. See id. at 1058-62.
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decisionmaking in the administrative law context.
2 4 Frank
In a 1998 article in Yale Law Journal,
Cross and
Emerson Tiller reported the results of their statistical analysis of 170
administrative law cases decided by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals between 1991 and 1995. They found that the policy
preferences of the members of panels had a significant effect on their
decisionmaking 5 Specifically, they found that a panel was 31% more
likely to uphold an agency action if the policy preferences of the
members of the panel were consistent with the policies implicit in the
agency action. 6 Cross and Tiller also found that a politically unified
panel was almost twice as likely as a politically divided panel to
decide a case in a manner consistent with the judges' policy
preferences. 7
Cross and Tiller referred to this result as the
"whistleblower effect": The existence of one member of the panel
whose policy preferences differ from those of the majority creates an
implicit threat of a dissent that tends to deter the majority from
manipulating or distorting precedents and doctrines to achieve an
outcome that is consistent with their policy preferences. 2
The first finding in the Cross and Tiller study supports the
Shapiro and Levy belief that judges decide administrative law cases
based in part on their policy preferences for a particular outcome.
The second finding supports the Shapiro and Levy belief that judges
attempt to advance simultaneously their often conflicting craft and
outcome goals. The value a judge places on craftsmanship is
attributable, at least in part, to the judge's reputational interest.29
Most judges do not want to be known as result-orientedmanipulators
24. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, JudicialPartisanshipand Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155
(1998).
25. See id. at 2171.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 2172.
28. See id. at 2173-74. Coincidentally, the whistleblower effect documented by Cross
and Tiller identifies one of the potential social values of legal and political science studies
of judicial decisionmaking. Scholars can play a role similar to that of a dissenting judge.
By blowing the whistle on result-oriented manipulation of precedents and doctrines, we
can hope to have some slight effect on judicial decisionmaking, that is, by deterring judges
from departing from craft norms to obtain outcomes they prefer, and by identifying and
supporting adoption of doctrines that reduce the potential for that pattern of judicial
behavior.
Judge Harry Edwards has provided a plausible alternative explanation for the pattern
of decisionmaking detected by Cross and Tiller. He explains the pattern with reference to
the D.C. Circuit's strong tradition of collegial decisionmaking. See Harry T. Edwards,
Collegialityand DecisionMaking on the D.C. Circuit,84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1357-62 (1998).
29. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 19, at 1055.
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of doctrines and precedents. It follows that a judge will choose craft
over outcome more frequently in the presence of a judge who is likely
to write a dissenting opinion that exposes weaknesses in the
craftsmanship of the majority opinion.
In a 1997 article in Virginia Law Review,3 Richard Revesz
published the results of his multivariate study of 250 D.C. Circuit
decisions issued between 1970 and 1994 in which the court resolved
disputes with respect to the validity of actions taken by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). Revesz's findings
provide powerful support for both the political scientist's attitudinal
model and for the more complicated Shapiro and Levy model.
Revesz found that a judge's ideology correlated with her pattern of
decisionmaking during all periods of time studied and in most
contexts.3 ' In fact, Revesz concluded that methodological limitations
embedded in the prior political science studies of judicial
decisionmaking caused such studies to "underestimate the extent of
ideological voting."32 Ideology was an extraordinarily powerful
predictor of judicial behavior when a panel resolved a procedural
dispute raised by a regulatee during the period between 1987 and
1993. 33 During that period of time, panels consisting of two
Democrats and one Republican reversed the EPA in only 2% to 13%
of cases.' In stark contrast, panels consisting of two Republicans and
one Democrat reversed the EPA in 54% to 89% of cases.35 Thus, the
likelihood that the EPA would be reversed by a D.C. Circuit panel on
procedural grounds during the period between 1987 and 1993 was
almost entirely dependent on the political composition of the panel
that decided the case. These findings support the attitudinal model
and the outcome preference component of the Shapiro and Levy
model.
Another contrasting pair of findings in the Revesz study support
the relative doctrinal determinacy component of the Shapiro and
Levy model. Revesz found a difference between the reversal rates of
Democratic and Republican panels in the context of industry
challenges to the procedural adequacy of EPA decisions during the

30.
83 VA.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Richard L. Revesz, EnvironmentalRegulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit,
L. REv. 1717 (1997).
See id. at 1738-43.
Id.at 1766.
See id. at 1763.
See id.
See idL
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period between 1987 and 1993.36 He found no statistically significant
difference between the decisions of Republican and Democratic
panels during that period, however, in the context of industry
challenges to the substantive validity of EPA actions.37 Revesz
concluded that this stark difference supported his "hierarchical
constraint hypothesis": A circuit court is less likely to engage in
ideological decisionmaking when its decision is likely to be reviewed
by the Supreme Court. 3 Revesz noted that the Supreme Court is
much more likely to review a circuit court decision resolving a
substantive issue than a circuit court decision resolving a procedural
issue.39 I am skeptical that the hierarchical constraint hypothesis
alone can explain such a disparity between substantive and
procedural decisionmaking. While the probability that the Court will
reverse a procedural decision is certainly lower than the probability
that it will reverse a substantive decision, even the probability that it
will reverse a substantive decision is tiny.
There is an alternative explanation for the enormous
substantive/procedural disparity Revesz found. As Revesz noted, the
substantive decisions involved judicial review of EPA's statutory
interpretations,40 while the procedural decisions involved application
of the "hard look" doctrine to EPA's reasoning in support of its
decisions.4 ' Thus, the substantive decisions were governed by the
Chevron doctrine, 42 while the procedural decisions were governed by
the State Farm doctrine. 43 The Chevron doctrine has proven to be
relatively determinate and to produce relatively predictable results in
circuit court decisionmaking. 44 By contrast, the State Farm doctrine is
36. See id. at 1749, 1763.
37. See id. at 1747-48.
38. Iad at 1767.
39. See id at 1750.
40. See id. at 1747-48.
41. See id at 1769-70.
42 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984). For a detailed discussion of Chevron, see 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, at
§§ 3.1-.6.
43. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983). For a detailed discussion of State Farm, see 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, at

§ 7.4.
44. Several scholars have found that the Supreme Court has a tendency to manipulate
the Chevron doctrine to further ideological goals. See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Mathew L.
Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 65;
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,72 WASH. U. L.Q.
351 (1994); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 CoLUM. L. REV.
749 (1995).
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a caricature of an indeterminate doctrine.45 It is infinitely malleable.
Thus, Revesz's findings provide powerful support for the relative

doctrinal determinacy component of the Shapiro and Levy model of
judicial decisionmaking.

The findings of the Cross and Tiller study and the Revesz study
support the model that Shapiro and Levy constructed on the basis of

their analysis of the many prior studies reported in the political
That model predicts a pattern of judicial
science literature.
decisionmaking that is largely determined by the ideologically-based

outcome preferences of judges in any context in which judicial
decisions have significant ideological implications and in which the

applicable doctrines are relatively indeterminate. Standing may be
the best single example of a context in which judicial decisions have

significant ideological implications. If environmentalists or banks
cannot obtain access to the courts, for instance, they cannot prevail in
even the most meritorious legal action. Thus, judicial decisions that
deny standing to environmentalists, for example, will reduce
significantly their ability to influence decisionmaking by federal
agencies46 and will reduce significantly the level of enforcement of
environmental rules.47 That result would delight most of my fellow
Republicans and dismay most Democrats. In order to see whether
standing meets the relative indeterminance criterion in the Shapiro
and Levy model, it is necessary to identify and analyze the doctrines
applicable to standing. I begin that task with a discussion of the five
All of the studies of circuit court applications of Chevron, however, have found either
no ideological manipulation of the doctrine or relatively modest manipulation. Revesz
found no evidence of ideological manipulation of Chevron. See Revesz, supra note 30, at
1747-48. Cross and Tiller found a 31% difference between the manner in which
Democrats and Republicans apply Chevron. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 24, at 2171.
That difference is much lower, however, than the massive difference Revesz found in
applications of the State Farm doctrine. See Revesz, supra note 30, at 1763. Orin Kerr
found that Democrats and Republicans differed with respect to their applications of
Chevron in only a few specific substantive contexts. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on
Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 36-40 (1998).
45. See Edwards, supra note 28, at 1362-63; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended
Effects of JudicialReview of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributedto the
Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMINH.
L. REV. 7, 8 (1991); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two
Problemsin Administrative Law: PoliticalPolarityon the Districtof Columbia Circuit and
JudicialDeterrenceof Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300,300-13.
46. For an explanation of the relationship between standing and influence on agency
policy-making, see 3 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, at § 16.11.
47. Congress has authorized "any person" to bring an action to enforce most
environmental rules, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994), but the Court has relied on standing
as a vehicle to limit severely the parties who can bring such enforcement actions. See infra
text accompanying notes 61-75.
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standing cases in -which the Supreme Court Justices divided along
ideological lines between 1991 and 1998.
II. FIVE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The "black letter" law of standing can be stated in a single
sentence. A plaintiff has standing if he has suffered a legally
cognizable and judicially redressable injury caused by the allegedly
illegal conduct of the defendant, and the plaintiff is attempting to
further an interest that is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional provision at
issue.4 The Court attributes the injury requirement to the case or
controversy clause of Article III of the Constitution, while the zone of
interests test is a product of statutory interpretation. The apparent
simplicity of the law of standing disappears quickly, however, upon
reading the dozens of Court opinions that interpret and apply each of
the elements of the doctrine. I concentrate initially on the opinions
issued in five cases decided between 1991 and 1998. The first three
cases focused on the nature of a judicially cognizable and redressable
injury, while the last two focused on the zone of interests test.
In Lewis v. Casey,49 the Court decided what qualifies as an injury
sufficient to confer on a prisoner standing to argue, on the merits, that
a prison administrator is violating the prisoner's constitutional right
to access to the courts by failing to maintain an adequate law library. 0
Twenty-two inmates alleged that they suffered injuries attributable to
a variety of inadequacies in the law library at the Arizona state
prison.51 The five-Justice majority held that only one of the prisoners
had suffered a judicially cognizable injury.52 The majority concluded
that a prisoner is injured by an inadequacy in a prison law library only
if the inadequacy caused the prisoner to be unable to pursue a non48. See 3 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, at §§ 16.1-.16. The five recent cases I use to
illustrate the malleability of modem standing law and the Justices' tendency to manipulate
that body of law to further their political and ideological agendas are broadly
representative of the more than 100 standing cases the Court has decided during the last
two decades, as many scholars have demonstrated. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The
Structure of Standing,98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A
Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice
Scalia, Standing,and Public Law Litigation,42 DuKE L.J. 1141 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein,
What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article II, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 163 (1992); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of SelfGovernance,40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
49. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
50. See id. at 349.
51. See id. at 346.
52- See id. at 358.
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frivolous legal claim related to his conviction or to the conditions of
his confinement.53
The concurring Justices criticized the majority for emphasizing
standing rather than the merits54 and for establishing an unduly
demanding test for standing 5 The concurring Justices noted that the
majority's test for standing requires a prisoner to prove that he lost
the opportunity to pursue an otherwise meritorious claim because of
a particular arguable law library deficiency as a prerequisite for
judicial consideration of the adequacy of that particular characteristic
of the library. 6 Thus, a prisoner would have standing to challenge the
adequacy of a library that does not include Supreme Court opinions
only if he can first persuade a court that he would have a decent
chance of prevailing if he had known of the existence of a Supreme
Court decision to which he had no access. The concurring Justices
saw no justification in Article III to require a court to determine that
a legal dispute is probably meritorious as an essential prerequisite to
reaching the merits of the dispute;57 they thought it enough that a
dispute "'will be presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.' "I5 The majority
responded by acknowledging that the standard urged by the
concurrence would have satisfied the requirements for standing as
recently as 1968.59 The majority referred to subsequent cases,
however, in which the Court announced the much more demanding
" 'actual injury' "test it expanded and applied in Lewis."
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,6' a six-Justice majority held
unconstitutional as applied the citizen suit provisions that Congress
included in the Endangered Species Act ("ESA")6' and a score of
other environmental statutes.63 This case was the first time in which
at 351-55.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 393 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment). Justice Thomas filed a separate concurrence on different grounds. See id.
concurring).
at 364 (Thomas, J.,
55. See id. at 398-402 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring
in the judgment).
56. See id. at 399 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment).
57. See id. at 401 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment).
58. Id. at 398-99 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968)).
59. See id. at 353 n.3.
60. Id.
61. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
63. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573-78.
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the Court had relied on standing as the basis to hold a statute
unconstitutional. 64 The majority held that two individuals would not
suffer any judicially cognizable and redressable injury attributable to
U.S. government decisions to provide financial support for two large
projects that would have adverse effects on the habitats of two
endangered species.' The individuals had professional interests in
studying the endangered species, had visited their habitats in the past,
and planned to make similar visits in the future.6 The existence of a
four-Justice plurality opinion and two concurring opinions creates
difficulties in interpreting the majority decision. 67 All six Justices who
comprised the majority found one fatal defect in the plaintiffs'
attempts to prove injury. By testifying only that they planned to visit
the habitat of the endangered species " 'in the future,' " they had

failed to prove an "'imminent' " injury.6 The three Justices who
dissented on the standing issue characterized the plurality opinion as
"a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of environmental
standing.

'69

In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,70 a six-Justice
majority again relied on standing as the basis for holding citizen suit
provisions of environmental statutes unconstitutional as applied. The
majority held that Article III precludes a court from entertaining a
suit to enforce an environmental statute in the context of a "wholly
past" violation,7 even when the plaintiff has suffered a judicially
cognizable injury attributable to the violation.
The majority
concluded that the plaintiff's injury was not redressable because any
fine would go to the government, rather than to the plaintiff, and
because an injunction cannot redress a past injury. 72
The three Justices who dissented on the standing issue
questioned the legitimacy of the majority's reliance on lack of
redressability as the basis for holding a statute unconstitutional.73 The
dissenting Justices noted that the Court introduced redressability into
64. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power,42 DuKE L.J. 1170, 1172 (1993).
65. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-78.
66. See id at 563-64.
67. See Pierce, supranote 64, at 1171-74.
68. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564; id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
69. Id.at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70. 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
71. lIdat 1017-20.
72- See id at 1020.
73. See id at 1027 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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its standing jurisprudence only twenty-five years before and that it
had never relied solely on the lack of redressability of an injury as the
basis to deny standing.74 The dissenting Justices also argued that a
fine imposed for a past violation of a statute would provide the
plaintiffs redress in the form of a reduction of the risk that the
defendant would violate the statute in the future.75
In Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal
Workers Union76 and National Credit Union Administration v. First
NationalBank & Trust Co. ("NCUA"),77 the Court relied on statutory
interpretation to deny standing to employees and to grant standing to
banks. In Air Courier Conference, a six-Justice majority held that
postal employees lacked standing to obtain review of a decision
allowing competitors of the Postal Service to perform services that
previously could be performed only by the Postal Service, even
though the employees suffered injury-in-fact attributable to that
decision in the form of lost jobs and lost wages. 78 The majority held
that the employees did not fall within the zone of interests protected
by the Private Express Statutes, 79 statutes that confer a legal
monopoly on the Postal Service. They found no evidence in the
language or legislative history of the statute "that Congress intended
to protect jobs with the Postal Service."80 Instead, "the congressional
concern was ...with the receipt of necessary revenues for the Postal

Service."'" The majority held that the absence of evidence of
congressional intent to benefit the plaintiffs was fatal to their attempt
to obtain access to the courts.82
In NCUA, a five-Justice majority held that banks had standing to
obtain review of a decision that allowed a credit union to expand its
membership. 3 The majority concluded that the interests of banks fell
within the zone of interests protected by the Federal Credit Union
Act,84 even though "there is no evidence that Congress ...was at all
74. See id. at 1027-28 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
75. See iLat 1029 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
76. 498 U.S. 517 (1991).
77. 118 S.Ct. 927 (1998).
78. See Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 524-30.
79. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1699 (1994); 39 U.S.C.§§ 601-606 (1994).
80. Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 524-25.
81. Id. at 525-26.
82. See id at 524-25. Three concurring Justices criticized the majority for addressing a
"hypothetical standing question" when a statute clearly precluded review of the decision
in any event. Id. at 531 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
83. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 118 S.Ct. 927,

933-38 (1998).
84. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1511-1795k (1994). The provision at issue in the case was 12 U.S.C.
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concerned with the competitive interests of commercial banks, or
indeed at all concerned with competition."' 5
The majority
distinguished Air Courier Conference as a case in which employees
were denied standing because they did not suffer an injury directly
attributable to competition, 6 even though the Court did not even
address that issue in Air Courier Conference.87 The four dissenting
Justices demonstrated what the majority implicitly conceded-the
statute was not intended to protect banks from credit unions.8 " The
dissenting Justices criticized the majority for using reasoning that
"eviscerates the zone of interests requirement."'8 9

The first notable characteristic of the opinions in these five cases
is the strong convergence between the ideological preferences of the
Justices and their voting patternsf ° A political scientist with no
knowledge of the law of standing would have had no difficulty

predicting the outcome of each case and predicting thirty-one of the
§ 1759 (1994) (current version at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1759 (West Supp. 1999)).
85. NCUA, 118 S. Ct. at 936-37.
86. See id.at 938.
87. In Air CourierConference, the majority noted: "The District Court found that the
Unions had satisfied the injury-in-fact test ....This finding of injury was not appealed.
The question before us, then, is whether the adverse effect ...is within the zone of
interests." Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 524.
88 See NCUA, 118 S.Ct. at 945-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89. Id.at 940 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer voted to grant standing to the prisoners, see id. at 393-403 (Souter, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment), while Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas voted to deny standing to all but
one of the prisoners, see id. at 360. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992),
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor voted to grant standing to the
environmentalists, while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, and Thomas voted to deny standing to the environmentalists, see id. at 556-57. In
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998), Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg voted to grant standing to the environmentalists, see id. at 1021
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment), while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer voted to deny standing to the
environmentalists, see id. at 1008. In Air Courier Conference, Justices Stevens, Marshall,
and Blackmun saw no need to express a view on the employees' standing, see Air Courier
Conference, 498 U.S. at 531 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment), while Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter voted to deny the
employees standing, see id. at 530. In NCUA, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg voted to grant standing to the bank, see NCUA, 118 S.
Ct. at 938, while Justices O'Connor, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer voted to deny standing to
the bank, see id. at 940 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). I classify Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas as conservatives and Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer as moderate to liberal. Justices O'Connor and
Souter are the least ideological Justices; a political scientist would not be able to predict
their votes in standing cases based solely on their ideological preferences.
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thirty-three votes cast by Justices with clear ideological preferences,
based solely on his knowledge of the ideological preferences of the
Justices. Conservative Justices voted to provide banks access to the
courts and voted to deny access to prisoners, employees, and
environmentalists. With only two mild surprises, moderate to liberal
Justices voted to grant access to the courts to prisoners, employees,
and environmentalists, and voted to deny access to banks. 91 This level
of predictive accuracy-94%-is at least as good as the accuracy with
which a political scientist can predict the votes of members of the
House or Senate. The accuracy of the political scientist's outcome
predictions-100%-is even more impressive. It is far greater than
the level of accuracy any lawyer could attain by relying solely on his
knowledge of the law of standing to predict the outcome of the five
cases. The applicable legal doctrines were, and are, far too malleable
to use as the basis for predicting the outcome of the five standing
disputes the Court resolved.
In order to test the accuracy with which a lawyer could have
predicted the Supreme Court's standing decisions, it is necessary to
construct a hypothetical lawyer who probably has no real-world
This hypothetical lawyer has an encyclopedic
counterpart.
knowledge of the law of standing, but she has no knowledge of the
political and ideological preferences of the members of the Supreme
Court. Such a lawyer would have experienced great difficulty
predicting the outcome of the five standing disputes.
A politically naive lawyer would have found it a challenge to
predict the outcome of the standing dispute resolved in Lewis v.
Casey.9 The Court had not previously applied standing law in the
context of a prisoner's right to access to the courts, so there was no
precedent directly on point. It had, however, vacillated with respect
to the broader issue that was determinative of the outcome in Lewis.
The Court sometimes had asked the injury-in-fact question in broad,
probabilistic terms, and it sometimes had asked that question in
narrow, particularized terms. Thus, for instance, in its many decisions
holding that a firm has standing to challenge a decision to allow
another firm to compete with it, the Court consistently has taken a
91. The only votes that I found surprising on ideological grounds were those of Justice
Breyer against standing for the environmentalists in Steel Co. and by Justice Ginsburg for
standing for the bank in NCUA. In neither case was the surprising vote determinative of
the outcome. In Steel Co., the majority did not need Justice Breyer's vote to prevail. In
NCUA, Justice Ginsburg's surprising vote for the banks was offset by the decisions of both
of the non-ideological Justices-O'Connor and Souter-to vote against the banks.
92. 518 U.S. 343 (1996); see also text accompanying notes 49-60 (discussing Lewis).
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broad, probabilistic approach. It is enough for the plaintiff firm to
prove that the challenged decision has some potential to reduce the
revenues of firms like the plaintiff firm.93 The plaintiff certainly is not
required to undertake the much more daunting task of proving that it
would lose "particular" revenues as a result of the challenged decision
or that its loss was "imminent." Yet, in its then-recent decision in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,94 the Court had required proof of a
near certain particularized and imminent injury in a case where a
plaintiff sought to challenge a violation of an environmental statute.95
A politically naive lawyer would have no basis for predicting which of
these approaches to the injury element of standing doctrine the Court
would apply to prisoners. Of course, a legally naive political scientist
would not be handicapped by the lawyer's awareness of the two
conflicting lines of precedent.
He would simply predictaccurately-that the conservative Justices would find a way of greatly
limiting prisoners' access to the courts.
The outcome of Defenders of Wildlife also would have surprised
a politically naive attorney. In its 1986 decision in Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society,96 the Court held that plaintiffs

"undoubtedly... alleged a sufficient 'injury in fact' in that the whale
watching and studying of their members will be adversely affected by
continued whale harvesting." 9 There was no hint that the plaintiffs
would have to prove that their future whale-watching plans were
"imminent" in order to satisfy the injury-in-fact test. Moreover, the
Court had never before relied on standing as a basis to hold a statute
unconstitutional.9" In fact, it had relied heavily on statutes as a basis
for resolving many standing disputes. 99 The politically naive lawyer
would have predicted erroneously that Defenders of Wildlife would
be held to have standing.
The politically naive lawyer would have fared a bit better in
attempting to predict the outcome of the standing dispute in Steel

93. See, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 394-403 (1987);
Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1971); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154-56 (1970); Pierce, supra note 64, at 1174-75; infra
text accompanying notes 212-15 (discussing broad approach).
94. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
95. See id. at 560; see also supra text accompanying notes 61-69 (discussing Defenders

of Wildlife).
96.
97.
98.
99.

478 U.S. 221 (1986).
Id. at 231 n.4.
See Pierce, supranote 64, at 1177-82.
See 3 DAvIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 16.8, at 50-53.
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Co.10 He probably would have characterized the case as a toss-up.
By the time the Court decided Steel Co., it was clear that a court
could rely on standing to hold a statute unconstitutional. 1 1 On the
other hand, no decision had previously relied on the lack of
redressability of a judicially cognizable injury caused by the
defendant as the basis for holding a statute unconstitutional. The
prior cases in which redressability played a role involved situations in
which the Court also concluded either that the plaintiff did not suffer
a judicially cognizable injury or that the defendant did not cause the
plaintiff's injury."°
The politically naive lawyer almost certainly would have
predicted erroneously that the plaintiffs would be held to have
standing in Air Courier Conference.'03 It seems intuitively obvious
that allowing private firms to perform functions that previously were
performed exclusively by the Postal Service would cause injury-in-fact
to postal workers. Indeed, the government conceded that the postal
workers met the injury-in-fact test. The only dispute was with respect
to the results of application of the zone of interests test. In its most
recent prior opinion applying that test-its 1987 opinion in Clarke v.
Securities Industry Ass'n' °4 - the Court had emphasized that "the test
is not meant to be especially demanding" and that "there need be no
indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be
plaintiff."'0 5 Clarke held that a party would flunk the test only if its
"interests are so marginally related or inconsistent with the purposes
implicit in the statute that it cannot be reasonably assumed that
Congress intended to permit the suit."'0 6 Thus, a politically naive
lawyer would have predicted inaccurately that the Court would hold
that postal workers had standing to challenge a decision that would
cost them jobs and overtime pay.
Of course, the hypothetical attorney then would have relied on
Air Courier Conference as the basis for an erroneous prediction that

100. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998); supra notes 7075 (discussing the case).
101. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577-78 (1992); supra notes 61-69
(discussing the case).
102. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39-42 (1976);
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616-19 (1973).
103. See Air Courier Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S.
517 (1991); supra notes 78-82 (discussing the case).
104. 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
105. Id. at 399-400.
at 399.
106. Md2
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banks would not be held to have standing in NCUA. 1 7 In Air Courier
Conference, the majority described the zone of interests test as
requiring a determination of congressional intent to benefit the
would-be plaintiffs. Thus, it said: "We must inquire then, as to
Congress's intent in enacting the [Private Express Statutes] in order
to determine whether postal workers were meant to be within the
zone of interests protected by those statutes."' 8 The Court's holding
that the postal workers lacked standing was based on its conclusion
that there was no evidence that Congress intended to benefit postal
workers when it enacted the statute that protects the Postal Service
from competition." 9 It logically follows that banks would not have
standing to obtain review of an action taken under the Federal Credit
Union Act, since there was no evidence that Congress intended to
benefit banks, or to protect them from competition, when it passed
that statute. Yet, three of the same Justices who joined the majority
opinion denying standing in Air CourierConference based on absence
of evidence of legislative intent to protect postal employees joined an
opinion granting standing on the basis that absence of legislative
intent to protect banks was irrelevant in NCUA."0
They
disingenuously distinguished Air Courier Conference as a case in
which the Court denied standing on the basis that the petitioners did
not suffer a judicially cognizable injury-an issue that was not even
before the Court in Air Courier Conference."'
III. A STUDY OF CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS

The foregoing analysis of recent Supreme Court standing
decisions demonstrates that the doctrines that purport to govern
standing disputes are sufficiently malleable to allow the Justices to
use them as tools to further their ideological agendas. It does not
necessarily follow, however, that the doctrines are so malleable that
they are susceptible to result-oriented manipulation by circuit courts.
There are at least two differences between Supreme Court
decisionmaking and circuit court decisionmaking that render
hazardous any attempt to extrapolate from one decisionmaking
107. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 118 S. Ct. 927
(1998); supra notes 83-89 (discussing NCUA).
108. Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 524.
109. See id. at 524-26.
110. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy were members of the
majority in both NCUA and Air Courier Conference. See NCUA, 118 S.Ct. at 930; Air
CourierConference, 498 U.S. at 518.
111. See NCUA, 118 S. Ct. at 938; Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 524.
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The Supreme Court tends to decide more

difficult cases than circuit courts, and the Supreme Court alone has

the power to change doctrines. Both of these differences suggest the
likelihood that the votes of the Justices are more likely to be

consistent with their outcome preferences than are the votes of circuit
court judges.

In order to determine whether circuit court judges manipulate
standing doctrines to obtain outcomes they prefer, I read the opinions
issued in each of the thirty-three cases in which a circuit court decided

whether an environmental plaintiff had standing during the period
between the Court's decision in Defenders 'of Wildlife in 1992 and
May 1, 1998.112 During that five and one-half year period, circuit
112. I selected environmental cases on the assumption that the general political and
ideological leanings of judges would be clear in this area: Conservative judges are less
likely than liberal judges to grant standing. The following describes my search
methodology. I began by conducting a Westlaw search of the CTA database on May 14,
1998, using: DA(AFrER 1-1-1993) & "LUJAN V. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE" &
STANDING. I then eliminated the irrelevant cases, the cases without reported opinions,
two cases in which all judges held that plaintiffs had standing to raise one issue but not to
raise another issue, and the votes of district judges sitting by designation. The appointing
administration's party was used to determine the political affiliation of each judge. The
resulting cases were: Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 130 F.3d 464 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (1 Democrat votes yes; 2 Republicans vote no), rev'd, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (en banc), cert denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1999) (No. 98-1059); Public
Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir.
1997) (1 Republican votes yes; 2 Republicans vote no); Davis v. PhiladelphiaHousing
Authority, 121 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1997) (2 Republicans vote yes; I Republican votes no);
Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1997) (1 Democrat and 2 Republicans vote yes);
Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Jensen, 108 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1997) (1 Democrat and 2
Republicans vote yes); Reytblatt v. United States Regulatory Commission, 105 F.3d 715
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (2 Democrats and 1 Republican vote yes); Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105
F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 1997) (1 Democrat and 1 Republican vote yes), vacated sub nom. Ohio
ForestryAss'n v. Sierra Club, 118 S. Ct. 1665 (1998); Dubois v. United States Departmentof
Agriculture, 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996) (2 Democrats and 1 Republican vote yes);
Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996) (1 Democrat
and 2 Republicans vote yes); Friendsof the Earth, Inc. v. Crown CentralPetroleum Corp.,
95 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1996) (1 Democrat and 2 Republicans vote no); Florida Audubon
Society v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (4 Democrats vote yes; 7
Republicans vote no); LouisianaEnvironmentalAction Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (3 Republicans vote no); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996)
(1 Democrat and 2 Republicans vote yes); Inland Empire Public Lands CouncilAss'n v.
Glickman, 88 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 1996) (1 Democrat and 2 Republicans vote no); Idaho
Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt,58 F.3d 1392 (9th Cir. 1995) (3 Democrats vote yes);
Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Thomas, 53 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 1995) (3
Democrats vote yes); Humane Society of the United States v. Babbitt,46 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (1 Democrat and 2 Republicans vote no); National Wildlife Federation v. Espy, 45
F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 1995) (2 Democrats and 1 Republican vote yes); Sierra Club v. Marita,
46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995) (1 Democrat and 2 Republicans vote yes); Kelley v. Selin, 42
F.3d 1501 (6th Cir. 1995) (2 Republicans vote yes); Animal League Defense Fund, Inc. v.
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courts denied standing to environmental plaintiffs in 29% of cases,
but there was a large disparity in outcomes depending on each judge's
political affiliation. Republican judges voted to deny standing to
environmental plaintiffs in 43.5% of cases, while Democratic judges
voted to deny standing to environmental plaintiffs in only 11.1% of
cases. In other words, a Republican judge was almost four times as
likely as a Democratic judge to vote to deny an environmental
plaintiff standing during the period January 1, 1993, to May 1, 1998.
The disparity among D.C. Circuit judges was even larger. Republican
judges voted to deny standing to environmental plaintiffs in 79.2% of
cases, while Democratic judges voted to deny standing to
environmental plaintiffs in only 18.2% of cases. I was able to reject
the hypothesis that decisionmaking in standing cases is not influenced
by a judge's political affiliation at the 99% confidence level.113
One of the cases in the sample illustrates particularly well both
the indeterminacy of the applicable doctrines and the strong tendency
of judges to engage in ideologically driven doctrinal manipulation in
standing cases. In FloridaAudubon Society v. Bentsen,"4 the en banc
D.C. Circuit divided seven-to-four with respect to a standing issue.
As so often is the case, the vote was on straight party lines. Seven
Republicans voted to deny an environmental plaintiff standing, while
four Democrats voted to grant standing.11 5 The petitioners in the case
sought review of a determination by the Secretary of the Treasury
11 6
that ETBE, a gasoline additive, was eligible for a large tax credit.
Espy, 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (1 Democrat and 2 Republicans vote no); Salmon River
Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346 (9th Cir. 1994) (1 Democrat and 2
Republicans vote yes); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994) (3
Republicans vote no); Animal League Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (3 Republicans vote no); Alaska Centerfor the Environment v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981
(9th Cir. 1994) (1 Democrat and 2 Republicans vote yes); Horsehead Resource
Development Co. v. Browner, 16 F.3d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (2 Democrats and 1
Republican vote yes); Resources Limited, Inc. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 1994) (3
Republicans vote yes); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco Refining &
Marketing,2 F.3d 493 (3d Cir. 1993) (3 Republicans vote yes); Seattle Audubon Society v.
Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993) (2 Democrats and 1 Republican vote yes); Portland
Audubon Society v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993) (2 Democrats and 1 Republican
vote yes); Mt Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1568 (9th Cir. 1993) (2 Republicans
vote yes); PortlandAudubon Society v. EndangeredSpecies Committee, 984 F.2d 534 (9th
Cir. 1993) (2 Democrats and 1 Republican vote yes); Moreau v. FederalEnergy Regulatory
Commission, 982 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (3 Republicans vote yes).
113. I used both the chi-square test and the binomial test.
114. 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc).
115. Judges Sentelle, Silberman, Williams, Ginsburg, Henderson, Randolph, and
Buckley voted to deny standing, while Judge Rogers along with Chief Judge Edwards and
Judges Wald and Tatel dissented. See id. at 661.
116. See id. at 662.
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They submitted detailed affidavits, expert testimony, and reports that
attempted to demonstrate two types of injuries attributable to the
Secretary's decision: injuries to the enjoyment of use of wildlife
habitats and injuries to drinking water." 7 One petitioner was a
resident of Minneapolis.
She submitted a detailed affidavit,
accompanied by numerous studies and supported by expert
testimony, in which she purported to establish the following causal
sequence: (1) the tax credit will induce increased demand for
ethanol, a corn derivative; (2) farmers near Minneapolis will respond
to that increased demand by increasing their use of pesticides and
fertilizer in order to increase their corn yield; and (3) as a result, the
concentrations of pesticides and fertilizer will increase both in the
animal habitats she uses and in her drinking water." 8
The seven-judge majority held that the causal chain was too long
and too uncertain to support a finding that the Secretary's action
would cause "particularized injury" to any petitioner."9 The majority
also seemed to impose a virtually unattainable burden of proof on the
petitioners. The petitioners had not established a sufficient causal
relationship because they "ha[d] not demonstrated that individual
corn ...farmers in these areas will affirmatively respond to the tax

credit by significantly increasing production."'20 It should be noted
that the D.C. Circuit does not require petitioners to prove the actions
of individuals in order to establish standing in non-environmental
cases. It has recently rejected imposition of such a requirement as
part of its competitive injury doctrine."' In the view of the
Republican members of the court, an environmentalist must prove
particularized injury directly attributable to agency action, while a
corporation need prove only a generalized, probabilistic, and indirect
relationship between the agency action and the injury.
The lengthy opinion of the four dissenting judges in Florida
Audubon Society describes the extensive and detailed evidence
tendered by the petitioners to establish each of the links in the causal
chain.'2 The dissenting judges expressed the view that petitioners
had demonstrated a causal relationship between the agency action
117. See id.; id. at 677-78 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
11& See iLat 677-84 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
119. See id at 663-72.
120. I at 667 (emphasis added).
121. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1497-99 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
see also Louisiana Energy & Power Auth. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 141
F.3d 364, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that under the competitive injury doctrine, a
plaintiff need not prove specific and particularized injury).
122. See FloridaAudubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 677-84 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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and two types of particularized injury to the petitioner who was a
resident of Minneapolis. The dissenting judges engaged in wellsupported criticism of the extraordinary burdens imposed by the
majority:
The irony of the rule announced by the majority today is
that it "in essence... require[s] that the plaintiff conduct the
same environmental investigation that he seeks in his suit to
compel the agency to undertake." The opinion ... imposes
so heavy an evidentiary burden ... to establish standing that

it will be virtually impossible to bring a [National
Environmental Policy Act] challenge to rulemakings with
diffuse impacts.1 3
We are now in a position to apply the Shapiro and Levy model of
judicial decisionmaking in the context of decisions with respect to
standing. Shapiro and Levy posit that judges will choose to sacrifice
pursuit of craft norms in order to obtain the outcomes they prefer for
political and ideological reasons when a class of disputes has
significant ideological implications and when resolution of that class
of disputes is governed by application of relatively indeterminate
legal doctrines. 4 Standing disputes satisfy the first criterion. By
severely limiting the circumstances in which environmental plaintiffs
have access to courts, for instance, a few standing decisions can have
dramatic effects on the outcome of many thousands of disputes
between environmentalists and firms that are subject to
environmental regulation.
Both the voting patterns of judges in standing cases and the
reasoning in the opinions written in those cases demonstrate the high
degree of indeterminacy of the applicable doctrines-thus meeting
the second criterion of the Shapiro and Levy model.125 Any judge can
write a reasonably well-crafted opinion granting or denying standing
in a high proportion of cases. The Supreme Court has issued so many
opinions on standing with so many versions of injury, causation,
redressability, and zone of interests that any competent judge can find
ample precedent to support broad or narrow versions of each of the
doctrinal elements that together comprise the law of standing. 126 This
characteristic of the applicable doctrines is apparent in the opinions
123. Id. at 675 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting City of Davis v.
Coleman, 521 F.2d 661,671 (9th Cir. 1975)).
124. See Shapiro & Levy, supranote 19, at 1056-62.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 49-123 (reviewing Supreme Court and circuit
court opinions).
126. For a comprehensive discussion of the Supreme Court's standing opinions, see 3
DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, at §§ 16.1-.16.
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of the en banc D.C. Circuit in Florida Audubon Society. Both the
seven Republicans and the four Democrats cited numerous Supreme
Court opinions to support their politically preferred outcomes of the
dispute.
I take it as a given that doctrinal indeterminacy and ideologically
motivated judicial manipulation of malleable doctrines are bad for
the U.S. legal system. Those characteristics of a legal system are
inconsistent with any version of "the rule of law."'12 7 Indeed, it is
particularly bad when a right as important as access to the courts
depends primarily on the political and ideological preferences of the
individual judges who decide a case. We might have to acquiesce in
such a state of affairs, however, if the doctrines that are the source of
the problem are solidly anchored in the text of the Constitution, the
best evidence of the intentions of the Framers of the Constitution,
sound prudential reasoning, or perhaps even stare decisis. Thus, the
next logical step is to identify, and to evaluate, the sources of the
doctrines that describe the modem law of standing.

IV. THE BASES FOR THE MODERN LAW OF STANDING
A.

ConstitutionalText

The most obvious and potentially compelling source of modem
standing law would be the plain meaning of the language of the
Constitution. It is easy to rule out that potential source of authority,
however. The Constitution provides only that "[t]he judicial power
shall extend to all Cases ...[and] Controversies." 28 Neither "case"
nor "controversy" is defined, and both terms are broad enough
linguistically to encompass every case the Court has declined to
resolve on standing grounds.
B.

OriginalIntent

The next most obvious and potentially compelling source would
be the intent of the Framers. It is equally easy to rule out that
potential source of authority. The only remotely relevant reference
to the case or controversy clause is Madison's unhelpful and circular
assertion that the judicial power ought "to be limited to cases of a

127. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in
ConstitutionalDiscourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997) (describing and explaining several
versions of "the rule of law").
128. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
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Judiciary Nature."'12 9 Madison's statement does suggest, however,
that the Framers wanted to restrict the courts to resolving the types of
disputes they had traditionally resolved. That, in turn, suggests that a
careful historical study of the practices of English and colonial courts
should provide the best evidence of the jurisdictional limits on the

power of the judiciary. This endeavor is well-plowed ground. Four
scholars have devoted many thousands of hours to the task of reading
English and colonial judicial decisions to determine the types of cases
courts decided, and the types of plaintiffs who brought those cases, in
an effort to try to find some linkage between their practices and the
modern law of standing: Louis Jaffe in 1961,130 Raoul Berger in
1969,"' Steven Winter in 1988,132 and Cass Sunstein in 1992.133
The findings of the four historical studies are remarkably
consistent. Both English and colonial courts regularly resolved
disputes brought by "strangers" and "informers."" Neither English
nor colonial courts applied any jurisdictional limit that bore any

resemblance to the modern law of standing. 135 Standing is not
mentioned at all in any English case until 1807.136 No English case
even discussed the possibility that a private individual might not have

standing to assert a public right until 1897.1 Neither English nor
colonial courts required a plaintiff to establish "injury-in-fact" as a
prerequisite to judicial resolution of a dispute.138 All courts applied
the doctrine of damnum absque injuria as the basis for potential
dismissal of a cause of action. 139 That doctrine, however, bore no
relation to the modern law of standing. The relevant "injuria" was
129. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911).
130. See Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure JudicialReview: PublicActions, 74 HARV.
L. REv. 1265 (1961).
131. See Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional
Requirement?,78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969).
132. See Winter, supra note 48.
133. See Sunstein, supra note 48.
134. See Berger, supra note 131, at 819, 827; Jaffe, supranote 130, at 1274-75; Sunstein,
supranote 48, at 171-73; Winter, supra note 48, at 1396-97, 1401-04, 1406-09; see also Evan
Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341 (1989) (providing
extensive historical support for the proposition that qui tam actions are constitutional).
135. See Berger, supranote 131, at 818; Winter, supra note 48, at 1395.
136. See Jaffe, supra note 130, at 1270.
137. See id. at 1271-72.
138. See Berger, supra note 131, at 817-18, 840; Jaffe, supra note 130, at 1308; Sunstein,
supranote 48, at 169-71; Winter, supra note 48, at 1396.
139. See Jaffe, supra note 130, at 1271; Sunstein, supra note 48, at 170-71, 177-179;
Winter, supra note 48, at 1425-51. Damnum absque injuriais generally defined as "[loss,
hurt, or harm without injury in the legal sense; that is, without such breach of duty as is
redressible by a legal action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (6th ed. 1990).
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not the "injury-in-fact" required by the modern law of standing.
"Injuria" existed if a plaintiff had a cause of action rooted in the
common law, equity, or a statute. 40 Thus, at the time the
Constitution was drafted and ratified, any court would have held that
a plaintiff who had a statutory cause of action had suffered an
"injuria."
The decisions of state and federal courts in the early years
following the drafting of the Constitution also should provide
evidence of any Article III limit on the power of the judiciary. Surely,
at least one of the early judges or Justices would have had occasion to
refer to Article Ill limits on the power of the judiciary if the Framers
intended to create such limits. Again, however, all of the scholars
who have researched this question have reached the same conclusion.
The early Congresses enacted several statutes that authorized private
individuals to assert public rights, including the Judiciary Act of
1789.'4' United States courts routinely resolved many disputes in
which the plaintiff had not suffered an "injury-in-fact" as the Court
has defined that term in modern standing cases. 42 The first Supreme
Court opinion to include reasoning remotely similar to modem
standing cases was issued in 1923.'43 The first opinion that stated in
dicta that Article III standing limits judicial power was issued in
1944.'" The first opinion that referred to "injury-in-fact" as an
Article Ill limit on judicial power was issued in 1970.' a The Court
first introduced the causation and redressability requirements in
1973.146 This history has convinced each of the scholars who have
studied it that absolutely no historical support exists for the
proposition that Article III imposes limits on the types of plaintiffs
that can obtain access to federal courts. 47
140. See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 170-71, 177-79.
141. See Berger, supra note 131, at 840-41; Caminker, supra note 134, at 342 n.3;
Sunstein, supra note 48, at 174-76; Winter, supra note 48, at 1406-09.
142. See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 169-70, 173-75; Winter, supra note 48, at 1377,
1401-09.
143. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Berger, supra note 131, at 818-19;
Sunstein, supranote 48, at 179-81; Winter, supra note 48, at 1375-76.
144. See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 169 (citing Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944)).
145. See id. (citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970)).
146. See Winter, supra note 48, at 1379 (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614
(1973)).
147. See Berger, supra note 131, at 817-18; Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255, 302 (1961); Sunstein, supra note 48, at
169-70; Winter, supra note 48, at 1374. Recently, two scholars have argued that Article II
can support at least some elements of standing law, but their argument is based not on
history but on modem policy considerations. See Harold J. Krent & Ethan G.Shenkman,
Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793 (1993).
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C. Stare Decisis
The four major scholarly histories of standing also provide the
basis for determining the extent to which modem standing law is
based on stare decisis. The entire modem law of standing is
unsupported by any precedent earlier than 1944.148 Its primary
doctrinal elements-injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability-are
unsupported by any precedent earlier than 1970.149 Moreover, the
Court has expanded standing law in unprecedented ways during the
1990s. Thus, for instance, the 1992 opinion in Defenders of Wildlife
was the first to hold that lack of Article III standing precludes a
plaintiff from litigating a statutorily authorized cause of action."0
Similarly, the 1998 opinion in Steel Co. was the first to hold that a
plaintiff could not pursue a statutorily authorized cause of action
based solely on a judicial determination that his injury was not
redressable.'5 ' The Steel Co. majority cited an 1885 opinion in an
effort to support its assertion that redressability "has been ingrained
in our jurisprudence from the beginning."' 52
The majority's
interpretation of the opinion, however, is demonstrably ahistorical.
The Court in that case dismissed a bill in equity as a "clear case.., of
damnum absque injuria."'53 A dismissal based on damnum absque
injuria was the nineteenth-century equivalent of a modem dismissal
based on a failure to state a cause of action.1 54 Thus, the Court
dismissed the action because the plaintiff was trying to collect a debt
owed by a state, and there was at the time "no remedy by suit to
compel the state to pay its debts.

' 155

No nineteenth-century court

would have dismissed the complaint filed by the plaintiff in Steel Co.
on the basis of damnum absque injuria because a statute explicitly
gave the plaintiff a cause of action, thereby establishing "injuria" as a
156
matter of law.

Of course, now that the Court has created the doctrine of
constitutional standing out of whole cloth and has issued scores of
opinions elaborating and expanding the doctrine, there is recent
14& See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 169.
149. See id. at 169-70; Winter, supra note 48, at 1378-79.
150. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992); see also supra text
accompanying notes 61-69 (discussing case).
151. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1020 (1998); see also
supra text accompanying notes 70-75 (discussing case).
152- Steel Co., 118 S.Ct. at 1017 n.5.
153. Marye v. Parsons, 114 U.S. 325,328 (1885).
154. See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 170-71.
155. Marye, 114 U.S. at 328.
156. See Berger, supra note 131, at 817-18; Sunstein, supra note 48, at 170-71.
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precedent to support virtually any conceivable version of standing
law. As I illustrated in Parts II and III, recent opinions interpret and
apply all four of the doctrinal components of modem standing lawinjury, causation, redressability, and zone of interests-in highly
variable ways. It is easy to cite one or more modem precedents that
support both narrow and broad versions of each element of standing.
In this situation, it is hard to make a case that stare decisis compels
the Court to adhere to any particular version of modem standing law
in future cases.
D. Policy
Any claim that the Constitution, the original intent of the
Framers, or Anglo-American legal history and tradition compel
modem standing law is undermined by the historical studies of
standing. This lack of historical basis leaves the possibility that
modem standing law is rooted in policy considerations that have
arisen for the first time, or at least have increased in significance,
during the twentieth century. Powerful circumstantial evidence
supports this hypothesis.
Modem standing law originated with two Justices-Brandeis and
Frankfurter-during the 1920s through the 1950s. 157 Standing was
one of several doctrines they invented and eventually sold to a
majority of their colleagues to further an important policy goal: to
minimize the opportunities for activist judges to thwart the will of a
majority of citizens by relying on various provisions of the
Constitution to hold many new statutes and agency-administered
regulatory programs unconstitutional.158 Thus, the roots of modem
standing law lie in a perceived need to insulate democratic institutions
from activist, politically unaccountable judges who were hostile to the
new preferences expressed by the people and their elected
representatives.
Two related features of the standing doctrines created by
Brandeis and Frankfurter are particularly noteworthy. First, there is
no hint that the Brandeis/Frankfurter version of standing limited the
power of the legislature to create a cause of action by statute. Their
version of standing was designed to shield politically accountable
institutions from potential attacks by politically unaccountable judges.
They certainly did not intend to create a weapon that politically
157. See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 179-81; Winter, supra note 48, at 1374,1453-57.
158. See supra note 157 (citing sources); see also 3 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1,
§ 16.2 (discussing the historical evolution of standing).

1768

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

unaccountable judges could use to render statutes ineffective.
Second, the Brandeis/Frankfurter version of standing was similar in
effect to the ancient doctrine of damnum absque injuria. According
to their view, the Constitution itself does not create causes of
action. 9 It follows that a plaintiff could not litigate a case under the
Constitution unless he had a common law or statutory cause of action.
To illustrate this point, consider the famous case of Frothingham v.
Mellon,"6° which many consider to mark the birth of modern standing
law. The Court relied on standing to dismiss a taxpayer's complaint
that a federal statute violated the Tenth Amendment. 6 ' The Court
could have dismissed Frothingham's action against Mellon as
damnum absque injuria because the Tenth Amendment does not
create a cause of action and a taxpayer has no common law or
statutory cause of action to challenge the validity of a federal statute.
Viewed in this way, the Brandeis/Frankfurter version of standing was
consistent with Anglo-American legal tradition and, hence, with a
defensible interpretation of Article III.
The Burger Court greatly expanded the Brandeis/Frankfurter
version of standing in the 1970s and 1980s.162 Again, powerful
evidence exists to support the hypothesis that the expanded version of
standing created by the Burger Court was motivated by a desire to
further a policy goal. Indeed, the Burger Court's version of standing
appears to have been motivated by the same policy goal that induced
Brandeis and Frankfurter to create standing law in the first place. At
the time, the federal judiciary again included a large number of
activist judges-albeit liberal activists rather than the conservative
activists who concerned Brandeis and Frankfurter. Given the
opportunity to do so, many of the federal judges who sat during the
1970s and 1980s would devise creative interpretations of the
Constitution. They would then rely on these interpretations as the
basis to wrest control of foreign policy from the politically
159. The Court first held that the Constitution sometimes creates a cause of action in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389 (1971). It has since signaled its doubts with respect to the legitimacy of the Bivens
doctrine by severely limiting its scope. See 3 DAvIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 19.5. The
Court's unprecedented decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961), also had the
effect of creating a cause of action for violation of the Constitution by disingenuously
attributing to the Congress of 1871 an intent to create such a cause of action by enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 1603 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); 3 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 19.6, at 263.
160. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).

161. See id. at 479-80.
162. See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 169-70; Winter, supra note 48, at 1372-73, 1379-80.
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accountable branches, to exercise plenary power over many
important governmental institutions such as schools and prisons, and
to force executive branch agencies to reallocate their scarce resources
in ways the judges preferred. 63 The circumstances in which the
Burger Court applied its expanded version of standing strongly
suggest that the Burger Court was trying once more to insulate the
politically accountable branches of government from the constant
assaults of activist judges. An expanded version of standing law was
only one of many tools the Burger Court used in an effort to
accomplish this policy goal during the 1970s and 1980s.
There is also another broad similarity between the
Brandeis/Frankfurter version of standing and the Burger Court's
version of standing. Every case in which the Burger Court relied on
standing to dismiss a complaint could have been the subject of an
opinion dismissing the complaint as damnum absque injuria.1 4 To
illustrate this point, consider the famous case of Warth v. Seldin.165 In
that case, the Court relied on standing to dismiss complaints brought
by poor people, a developer, and a neighboring town claiming that a
municipality's zoning rules violated the Fourteenth Amendment.'66
The Court could have noted that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not itself create a cause of action and that none of the plaintiffs had a
common law or statutory cause of action. It then could have
reasoned like an eighteenth-century court or a nineteenth-century
court and dismissed the complaints as damnum absque injuria.
Viewed in this manner, the results of the Burger Court's application
of standing in Warth, and in all the other cases decided during the
1970s and 1980s, are entirely consistent with Anglo-American legal
tradition and, therefore, consistent with a defensible interpretation of
Article III.
The additional expansions of standing law apparent in the
decisions of the 1990s were almost certainly also motivated by a
desire to further one or more policy goals. However, it is more
difficult to identify the goal or goals the Justices were attempting to
further in these opinions. Three of the cases might be explained in a
manner consistent with the common goal of the Brandeis/Frankfurter
163. Justice Thomas provided a good summary of the extraordinarily activist actions of
federal courts in several contexts during this period in his concurring opinion in Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 364-93 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
164. See 3 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 16.7.
165. 422 U.S. 490 (1975); see also 3 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, §§ 16.1, 16.5
(discussing Warth).
166. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 502-17.
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and Burger Court versions of standing-protection of democratic
institutions from activist, politically unaccountable judges. The
majority opinion in Lewis v. Casey 67 furthered that goal. The
majority was attempting to insulate prison administrators from the
potential excesses of activist judges. The injunction the Court
reversed gave a district judge and a special master complete power to
dictate every detail of the structure, staffing, and hours of law
libraries in Arizona prisons. 6 s The result in Lewis is entirely
consistent with Anglo-American legal tradition and, hence, with a
defensible interpretation of Article III.
An eighteenth- or
nineteenth-century court would have dismissed the complaint
because the plaintiff had no cause of action.
It is also possible to reconcile both Air Courier Conference 69 and
NCUA7 ° with the policy goals that originally induced the Court to
create standing law and with a defensible interpretation of Article III.
The zone of interests test, which the Court applied in both cases,
prescribes a method of interpreting two statutes-the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") and the statute the plaintiff relies on as the
basis for its argument on the merits.' 7' As such, the zone of interests
test is consistent both with the respect for democratic institutions that
motivated the Court to create a law of standing and with the AngloAmerican tradition of entertaining a complaint if, but only if, the
plaintiff had a cause of action. There is only one problem with Air
Courier Conference and NCUA. The majority opinions in the two
cases adopt totally inconsistent methods of determining whether a
plaintiff has a cause of action. 72 Either method maybe defensible,
but both methods cannot logically be correct.
Defenders of Wildlife' 73 and Steel Co. 174 cannot be explained as

decisions that further the policy goal of insulating democratic
institutions from potential overreaching by activist judges. Congress
167. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); see also supra text accompanying notes
49-60 (discussing Lewis).
168 See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 347-48.
169. See Air Courier Conference v. American Postal Workers Union 498 U.S. 517
(1991); see also supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (discussing case).
170. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 118 S. Ct. 927
(1998); see also supranotes 83-89 and accompanying text (discussing case).
171. See 3 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 1, §§ 16.3, 16.7-16.9.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 103-11 (discussing Air Courier Conference and
NCUA); infratext accompanying notes 228-53 (discussing the zone of interests test).
173. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see also supra text
accompanying notes 61-69 (discussing case).
174. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998); see also supra
text accompanying notes 70-75 (discussing case).
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drafted the citizen suit provisions of environmental statutes in a
manner that minimizes the power of judges to become enmeshed in
the policymaking process.175 In both cases, the Court used standing
not to shield politically accountable institutions from activist judges,
but as a weapon a judge can use to thwart the will of politically
accountable institutions. 76 Congress enacted statutes that authorize
agencies to establish rules and that confer on "any person" a cause of
action to enforce the rules. The Court thwarted the will of the
legislature by saying that only a person who meets exceedingly
rigorous criteria, defined and applied by the judiciary, has such a
cause of action. The Court simultaneously rendered much less
effective the environmental rules established by the politically
accountable executive branch agencies by depriving them of access to
the significant enforcement resources Congress had attempted to
make available through the citizen suit provisions.
Ironically, as the Court has made it increasingly difficult for
many types of plaintiffs to obtain access to the courts, the need to
restrict access in order to protect politically accountable institutions
from the potential excesses of activist judges has declined
significantly. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Court created
numerous legal doctrines that limit the discretion of judges in the
classes of cases in which the risks of judicial overreaching are greatest.
Six doctrinal developments have been particularly important in
furthering this traditional goal of standing law.
First, the Court's landmark 1984 opinion in Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council177 instructs courts to defer to

agency interpretations of ambiguous provisions in agencyadministered statutes. 73 The Chevron doctrine greatly reduces the
risk that an activist judge will engage in a creative exercise in
statutory construction to force an agency to act in a manner consistent
with the judge's ideological preferences. 79 Second, in its landmark
1985 opinion in Heckler v. Chaney,8 0 the Court announced the
presumption of uureviewability of agency inaction. This presumption
greatly reduces the risk that a judge will force an agency to reallocate
175. See 3 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 18.5; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Agency
Authority to Define the Scope of Private Rights of Action, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 12-13
(1996).
176. See Pierce, supranote 64, at 1170.
177. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
178. See id. at 842-43.
179. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J.
2225,2233-34 (1997).
180. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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its scarce resources in a manner consistent with the judge's ideological
preferences.' 8' Third, in a series of opinions issued in the 1980s and
1990s, the Court has developed strict limits on courts' discretion to
impose "structural injunctions" on agencies and other important
societal institutions, such as schools and prisons.' s2 These restrictions
greatly reduce the risk that a judge will take over an institution and
manage it in a manner consistent with the judge's ideological
preferences.8 3 Fourth, in a series of opinions issued from 1979
through 1992, the Court virtually eliminated the discretion of judges
to find an "implied" private right of action for violation of an agencyadministered statute."s This change in doctrine eliminated the risk
that a judge would find an implied right of action that Congress did
not create when the existence of such a private right of action is
consistent with the judge's ideological preferences.185 Fifth, in its 1989
opinion in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,'86 the Court made it clear
that courts must enforce strictly the statutory conditions that limit the
power of a party to bring an express private right of action for
violation of an agency rule or order.'1 As a result, a private party
cannot bring an enforcement action without providing the agency
both advance notice of its intent to do so and an opportunity to
preclude the private enforcement action by bringing its own
enforcement action. Finally, Congress has assisted the Court in its
efforts to limit the power of activist judges to displace the judgment of
politically accountable institutions. In the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995,'81 for example, Congress limited the power of courts to
take over the management of prisons.
Each of these doctrinal changes responds directly to the major
sources of the risks that politically unaccountable institutions-courts
and/or private litigants-will force politically accountable institutions
to act in accordance with their political and ideological preferences.
Each of these changes is far more effective and more carefully
181. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency
Theory of Government,64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1267-68 (1989).
182- See, e.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343
(1996); Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995);
Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104 (1983).
183. See 3 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 18.3.
184. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S.
287 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
185. See 3 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 18.5.
186. 493 U.S. 20 (1989).
187. See id. at 25-33.
188. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to 1321-77 (1996) (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
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targeted than the crude and blunt tool of constitutional standing.
Moreover, each of these doctrines is anchored securely in a
combination of statutes and the Constitution. 8 9 Thus, they are more
defensible than the complicated combination of doctrines the Court
has made up out of whole cloth and attributed to the Framers under
the heading of constitutional standing.
The plurality opinion in Defenders of Wildlife and the majority
opinion in Steel Co. cannot be reconciled with Anglo-American legal
traditions and, hence, cannot be defended as plausible interpretations
of Article II1. An eighteenth- or nineteenth-century court would not
have doubted that it had the power-and the duty-to entertain a
cause of action explicitly created by a statute without any inquiry into
injury, causation, or redressability. Nor can these opinions be
reconciled with the policy goal that induced the Court to create a law
of standing. Thus, these opinions can only be explained with
Powerful circumstantial
reference to some other policy goal.
evidence suggests the policy goal that underlies the dramatic
expansion of standing law that has taken place in the 1990s. Justice
Scalia wrote both the plurality opinion in Defenders of Wildlife and
the majority opinion in Steel Co. He also wrote an essay describing
his views on standing in Suffolk University Law Review in 1983.190
Justice Scalia's essay begins with an assertion that suggests that
he sees standing as serving the same policy goal that motivated
Brandeis and Frankfurter to invent standing and that motivated the
Burger Court to expand the list of requirements to obtain standing:
"My thesis is that the judicial doctrine of standing is a crucial and
inseparable element of [separation of powers], whose disregard will
inevitably produce-as it has during the past few decades-an
overjudicialization of the processes of self-governance."' 191 By the end
of the essay, however, Scalia has convinced himself that pursuit of this
policy goal requires creation of a "doctrine of standing [that] is an
essential means of restricting the courts to their assigned role of
protecting minority rather than majority interests."'" It follows that
standing should never be available to a member of a majority who is
benefited by a statute, such as the Clean Air Act, even when the
legislature has authorized a suit by a member of the majority. 93
189. See Pierce, supra note 179, at 2227-48.
190. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separationof Powers,17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983).
191. Id at 881.
192 Id at 895.
193. See id at 895-96.
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Indeed, Scalia argues that courts should use standing law to ensure
that "important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of
Congress, [can be] lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the
federal bureaucracy.' ' 194 In other words, a legislative enactment that
benefits the majority can be enforced only by an executive branch
agency. If, and to the extent that, agencies lack the resources or the
will to enforce such a statute, it should not be enforced. The courts
can and should use standing to police this prohibition on law
enforcement by institutions or individuals other than executive
branch agencies, even when the politically accountable legislature
authorizes other institutions or individuals to enforce a statute. 95 In
short, Justice Scalia sees standing as providing a means by which the
judiciary can limit the power of the legislature-a policy that is very
nearly the opposite of the policy that motivated Brandeis,
Frankfurter, and the Burger Court.
Justice Scalia's essay on standing helps to explain his opinions in
Defenders of Wildlife and Steel Co. In his essay, and in both of his
standing opinions, he makes the same basic argument that he made in
his dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olson.196 In that opinion, Justice

Scalia argued that Congress could not assign certain investigative and
prosecutorial responsibilities to an independent counsel because law
enforcement has been performed by the executive "always and
everywhere."'
As numerous scholars have since documented,
Justice Scalia's assertion in Morrison v. Olson is historically
inaccurate. Institutions other than executive branch agencies,
including private individuals, often performed law enforcement
functions in Britain, in colonial America, in state courts, and in U.S.
courts.'
His virtually identical assertions about law enforcement
responsibilities in the standing context are equally false. AngloAmerican courts routinely entertained enforcement actions brought
by "informers" and "strangers" when legislatures authorized such

actions. 199 The courts left to politically accountable legislators the

choice among alternative means of enforcing the law. Thus, while
194. Id at 897.
195. See id. at 896.
196. 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. I& at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198. See, e.g., ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880, at 5-6 (1989); Caminker, supra note 134, at 34142; Steven L.
Carter, The Independent CounselMess, 102 HARv. L. REv. 105, 126-27 (1988); Stephanie
A.J. Dangel, Note, Is Prosecutiona Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the
Framers'Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1071-88 (1990).
199. See supra note 134 (citing sources).
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Justice Scalia's version of Democracy may be defensible in the
abstract, it is not the version adopted by Anglo-American courts and
implicitly adopted by the Framers. The Framers reposed greater trust
in politically accountable legislative bodies than does Justice Scalia.
V. THE FUTURE OF STANDING LAW
So far, I have documented the following four characteristics of
the modem law of standing. First, it is extraordinarily complicated
and malleable. In a high proportion of cases, a judge can write an
opinion that either grants or denies standing without departing from
the norms that define the craft of judging. Second, resolutions of
standing disputes have unusually large ideological implications. By
deciding that environmentalists or banks do not have access to the
courts, for example, judges decide, in effect, that they cannot prevail
in even the most meritorious cases. Third, judges take advantage of
the complicated and malleable standing doctrines to resolve a high
proportion of standing disputes in a manner consistent with each
judge's own political and ideological preferences. Thus, a Republican
judge is nearly four times as likely as a Democrat judge to vote to
2 00
Fourth, modem
deny standing to an environmental plaintiff
standing law has a highly questionable pedigree. It is unsupported by
the text of the Constitution, by the evidence of the original intent of
the Framers, or by Anglo-American legal history and tradition. It has
only weak, recent, and inconsistent support in stare decisis and in
pursuit of policy goals that are consistent with the Constitution.
Further, the extensions of standing law engineered by Justice Scalia in
1992 and 1998 are impossible to defend as plausible interpretations of
the Constitution.
This situation is not a pretty picture. Access to the courts should
be governed by the rule of law and not by the political preferences of
individual judges and Justices. A politically naive lawyer should be
able to predict with reasonable accuracy the likely resolution of a
Moreover, standing law should bear some
standing dispute.
resemblance to the original intent of the Framers.
What can, and should, the Court do to address this problem? It
is tempting to suggest that the Court simply abandon the entire
twentieth-century effort to create a law of standing as an illconsidered departure from the plain meaning of Article III, the
original intent of the Framers, and Anglo-American legal tradition. It
is, however, probably too late in the day to adopt that course of
200. See supranotes 112-13 and accompanying text.
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action. To avoid the unintended, adverse consequences of such a
complete abandonment of half a century of precedent, the Court
would need to resurrect some of the long-abandoned doctrines and
practices that allowed eighteenth- and nineteenth-century courts to
decline to resolve disputes that were inappropriate for judicial
resolution2 1 In addition, appropriately cabined, the law of standing
has little potential to do real harm. It is important to remember that
all of the disputes the Court refused to resolve on standing grounds
until 1992 were inappropriate for judicial resolution on other
grounds."°
They probably would have been dismissed by an
eighteenth- or nineteenth-century court on another basis. Moreover,
some version of the injury-in-fact requirement may have beneficial
effects. It does seem intuitively inappropriate for a private citizen to
be able to sue for conduct that has absolutely no adverse effect on
that plaintiff.
Four general types of changes in standing law that would have
beneficial effects are easily identifiable. The Court should simplify
the applicable doctrines, objectify the doctrines, increase the
consistency with which it describes and applies the doctrines, and
increase the deference it accords to politically accountable
institutions. Each of these changes would increase the degree of
determinacy of standing doctrines, reduce the number of cases in
which judges succumb to the temptation to manipulate precedents
and doctrines in order to further their ideological agendas, enhance
the predictability of the results of standing disputes, reduce the
resources litigants and courts must devote to resolution of standing
disputes, and, more broadly, place standing within the realm of law
rather than politics. These types of changes, and particularly changes
that increase judicial deference to politically accountable institutions,
also would produce a law of standing that bears a closer resemblance
to the intent of the Framers when they drafted Article III. No
eighteenth- or nineteenth-century court would have relied on lack of
standing or lack of injury-in-fact as the basis to refuse to resolve a
dispute at the behest of a party who had a cause of action. A modern
court should at least be reluctant to refuse to resolve a dispute when
the plaintiff has an explicit statutory cause of action, for example,
201. The Court would need to begin by overruling Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the FederalBureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961), in order to recreate the legal environment in which a plaintiff has no
cause of action based on a violation of the Constitution. See supra note 159 and
accompanying text.
202. See 3 DAvIS & PIERCE, supranote 1, § 16.7.
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when a statute authorizes "any person" to bring an action to enforce a
rule or order issued by an agency. In this section, I suggest these
types of changes applicable to each of the doctrinal elements of
modem standing law.
A. Injury and Causation
The Court should begin the process of beneficial reform of
standing law by focusing on the combination of injury-in-fact and
causation. The Court has used two dramatically different approaches
in answering the question whether a defendant's conduct caused the
plaintiff a judicially cognizable injury. In some cases, including many
of the cases in which the plaintiff lacked a cause of action 2 3 and the
two recent environmental cases,2' the Court required the plaintiff to
prove an "actual or imminent," "concrete and particularized" injury
"caused by" the defendant's conduct. Each of these descriptive
phrases is susceptible to manipulation by result-oriented judges.
Typically, Republican judges interpret and apply them in ways that
render it virtually impossible for an environmental plaintiff to
establish standing. The plurality opinion in Defenders of Wildlife
implicitly encouraged this conduct by concluding that one of the
plaintiffs-a professional biologist who had made a career out of
studying a particular endangered species-had not proven
"imminent" injury attributable to an action that concededly would
destroy habitat critical to the survival of the species because she
proved only that she planned to observe the species "in the future"
and did not prove that her next visit would be on a date certain in the
near future.20
The opinion of two Republican judges in PublicInterest Research
Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc.206 illustrates

the malleability of the tests of injury and causation adopted in the
Court's recent environmental cases and the ways in which judges can
manipulate doctrines to further their ideological agendas. The
203. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). See generally 3 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 1, §§ 16.5,
16.7 (discussing causality, redressability, and the differences between common law and
statutory standing).
204. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998); Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see also supra text accompanying notes 70-75
(discussing Steel Co.); supra text accompanying notes 61-69 (discussing Defenders of
Wildlife).
205. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564.
206. 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997).
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plaintiffs in Magnesium Elektron proved that (1) they use the
Delaware River for various recreational purposes; (2) their
recreational uses of the river are adversely affected by pollutants in
the river; (3) the defendant illegally discharged pollutants into the
river upstream of the plaintiffs' area of use on 150 occasions; and (4)
the pollutants were of a type that adversely affect the plaintiffs'
recreational uses.02 7 The majority held that the plaintiffs lacked
standing because they did not prove that the defendant's "particular"
emissions caused the plaintiff's "particular" injury. 2 8 No one can
possibly satisfy the test applied by the Republican majority in
Magnesium Elektron. The Delaware River has poor water quality
that adversely affects all recreational uses and users. 209 This poor
water quality is attributable to the combined effects of hundreds of
discharges-some legal and some illegal. No one using the river can
prove a "particular" injury attributable to a "particular" illegal
discharge. Moreover, it makes no sense to impose such an impossible
burden of proof on a would-be plaintiff. The agencies that decide
how much of a pollutant any individual regulatee can legally emit
make those decisions based on application of computer models that
relate aggregate emissions to water quality.20 Thus, a politically
accountable agency with relevant expertise has already determined
that emissions above the legally permitted level cause injury to water
quality and, hence, to recreational users. In this recurrent situation,
courts should defer to the politically accountable expert agency and
apply a causation per se doctrine.21 l
In other types of cases, including all of the "competitive injury"
cases212 and the environmental cases decided before 1992,213 the Court
used a completely different approach to defining the "injury" that
must be "caused" by the defendant as a prerequisite for the plaintiff
to have standing.
The approach is broad, permissive, and
probabilistic in nature. Thus, for instance, a bank has standing to
207. See id at 115-16, 121.
208. lId at 121-22.
209. See Richard C. Albert, The Historical Context of Water Quality Management for
the DelawareEstuary, 11 ESTUARIES 99, 106 (1988).
210. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(c)(1)(vii)(B) (1998); see, e.g., In re
Broward County, U.S. EPA Envtl. Appeals Bd., NPDES Appeal No. 95-7 (Aug. 27, 1996)
(order denying review), available in 1996 WL 514111, at *2.
211. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Causation in Government Regulation and Toxic Torts, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 1307 (1998).
212. See supra notes 93, 121 (citing cases).
213. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 231 n.4
(1986); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59,75-78 (1978); United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 683-90 (1973).
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challenge the validity of any rule or order that permits a potential
competitor to compete with a bank, or that enhances a competitor's
ability to compete effectively. 14 The bank is not required to prove
that a "particular" competitor will take advantage of the new
opportunity, and that the competitor will cause "particular" and
"imminent" injury to the bank by taking a "particular" customer from
the bank on a "particular" date. In most cases, of course, a bank
could not possibly meet such a demanding burden of proof. Nor
should it be required to do so. It should be enough that the
defendant's conduct has some potential to cause competitive harm to
the bank in some manner. That is the law applicable to banks,
investment firms, tour companies, data processing companies, and
drug manufacturers,21 5 but it is no longer the law applicable to
individuals who claim that they have been injured by pollution or by
an action that jeopardizes the continued survival of a species that an
individual studies.
In environmental cases, the Court should apply the same broad,
permissive, and probabilistic approach to injury and causation that it
routinely applies in competitor standing cases. The argument in
support of a permissive, probabilistic approach is particularly strong
in the
context of citizen suit cases like Defenders of Wildlife,216 Steel
Co., 217 and Magnesium Elektron.21 In each of these cases, Congress
had explicitly conferred a statutory cause of action on the plaintiffs.
By contrast, it is often far from clear that Congress intended to confer
a cause of action on a competitor, as even the. majority in NCUA
admitted 19 Thus, both adherence to the original intent of the
Framers and pursuit of the policy goal that induced the Court to
create standing law support the use of a more permissive approach to
standing in "citizen suit" cases than in most "competitive injury"
cases.
The redressability component of the standing test rarely presents
214. See 3 DAvIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 16.4. The Court explicitly adopted that
characterization of its "competitive injury" cases in Clinton v. New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091,
2100 (1998).
215. See supranotes 93,121 (citing cases).
216. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see also supra text
accompanying notes 61-69 (discussing case).
217. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998); see also supra
text accompanying notes 70-75 (discussing case).
218. See Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron,
123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997); see also supra text accompanying notes 206-08 (discussing
case).
219. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 118 S. Ct. 927,
936-37 (1998).
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an independent obstacle to a judicial determination that a plaintiff
has standing. In the vast majority of cases, the same circumstances
that persuade a court that the defendant's conduct did, or did not,
cause the plaintiff an injury also persuade the court that the injury is,
or is not, redressable by a judicial decision against the defendant on
the merits.' The only exception to the nearly complete convergence
of the causation and redressability requirements surfaced in Steel Co.
The majority in Steel Co. held that even a plaintiff who suffered an
injury caused by the defendant's conduct lacked standing because no
remedy available to a court could redress the plaintiff's injury when
that injury was attributable to a "wholly past" violation of an
environmental statute. 21 The redressability-based holding in Steel
Co. is unfortunate in many respects: it has no basis in the text of the
Constitution, the intent of the Framers, Anglo-American legal
tradition, stare decisis, or the policy goal that induced the Court to
create the law of standing. On the other hand, the holding has limited
potential to do any real harm to the legal system. As the concurring
Justices in Steel Co. recognized, the statute at issue, like most
environmental statutes, does not create a cause of action available to
a private citizen and applicable to a "wholly past" violation of a
statute.m It makes little practical difference whether a private
individual cannot sue because she lacks standing or because she has
no cause of action.
What does matter, however, is that the Court establish a simple,
objective test for distinguishing between "wholly past" violations and
"continuing violations," the latter of which even the Steel Co.
majority recognized to be within the jurisdiction of a court.M If the
Court announces instead a malleable test applicable to that outcomedeterminative distinction, it is safe to predict that many lower court
judges will likely manipulate the test to support their ideologically
preferred outcomes. 4
The facts of Steel Co. clearly placed the violation at issue in the
"wholly past" category. The defendant had failed to file mandatory
reports in a timely manner. When confronted with its lapse, it
220. See 3 DAvis & PIERCE, supranote 1, § 16.5.
221. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1018-20.
222. l at 1030-32 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
223. Id. at 1019. The Fourth Circuit's recent decision applying Steel Co. is discouraging
in this respect. The Fourth Circuit simply denied a plaintiff standing by applying Steel Co.
without even attempting to apply the distinction between "wholly past" and "continuing"
violations. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d
303,306-07 (4th Cir. 1998), cert.granted,119 S. Ct. 1111 (1999) (No. 98-922).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 112-23.
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immediately confessed error and filed all of the overdue reports. 22
The risk that the defendant would commit future violations in this
situation was remote. Most violations of environmental rules and
permits are, however, much more difficult to characterize. The
conduct that gives rise to an enforcement action is invariably "past"for example, a firm has violated its emissions permit 150 times in the
last three years. 6 But it is difficult to conclude that the violation is
either "wholly past" or "continuing." The defendant might, or might
not, take the actions required to avoid the risk of future violations. In
this recurring situation, the Court should establish a presumption that
multiple past violations foreshadow a high likelihood of future
violations and, hence, qualify as "continuing violations." That is the
type of situation in which the concurring Justices' discussion of
deterrence resonates. In the words of the concurring opinion in Steel
Co.:
"History supports the proposition that punishment or
deterrence can redress an injury....

When ...a party obtains a

judgment that imposes sanctions on the wrongdoer, it is proper to
presume that the wrongdoer will be less likely to repeat the injurious
conduct that prompted the litigation." 7
B. Zone of Interests
The discussion thus far has not focused on the zone of interests
test. In one sense, that component of standing law is not central to
my concerns. The Court does not attribute the zone of interests test
to Article IEI. Rather, the test is a means through which a court
attempts to determine whether Congress intended to give a party a
cause of action. As such, the zone of interests test is entirely
consistent with the Constitution and with Anglo-American legal
tradition.
In another important sense, however, the zone of interests test is
central to my concerns. In its present form, the test is extraordinarily
malleable. It can be, and frequently is, manipulated by judges to
further their ideological agendas.P The result of its application in
any case is impossible to predict on any basis except the political and
ideological preferences of the judges who decide the case.
225. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1009.
226. See, e.g., Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium
Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997); see also supra text accompanying notes 206-08
(discussing case).
227. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1029 & n.26 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 103-11.
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The Court derived the zone of interests test from section 702 of
the APA: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 9
The Court plausibly interpreted "adversely affected or aggrieved ...
within the meaning of a relevant statute" as authorizing review at the
behest of any party whose interests are "arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated" by the statute that is the basis
for the party's claim on the merits2 0 The basic problem that arises
with this statutory interpretation exercise is attributable to statutory
silence. The statutes to which APA § 702 refers rarely say anything
about standing and rarely identify explicitly the interests that are, or
are not, within the zone of interests to be protected' 31 In this
recurrent situation, a court could use one of two methods of applying
the zone of interests test. It could say that the plaintiff's interest is
within the zone only if there is specific, direct evidence that Congress
intended to protect the interest asserted by the plaintiff.
Alternatively, a court could draw the inference that Congress
intended to protect any interest that would in fact be protected by a
decision favorable to the plaintiff on the merits. Given the dearth of
direct evidence of congressional intent in most statutes, a court's
choice of one or the other of these methods of applying the test is
outcome-determinative in most cases.
Confronted with this important choice between two competing
methods of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court has chosen to
adopt both. In its 1987 opinion in Clarke v. Securities Industry
Ass'n,l2 the Court recognized that circuit courts were using two
different methods of applying the test, thereby producing inconsistent
and unpredictable results in many standing cases. A five-Justice
majority held that courts must use the broad, inferential method of
applying the test, thereby making it not "especially demanding. ' ' 33
Finding no specific evidence on the issue either way, the majority
relied on the presumption of reviewability to support its conclusion
229. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
230. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
The Court's interpretation of APA § 702 provoked a debate that continues today.
Compare Kenneth Culp Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450
(1970) (arguing in support of the zone of interests test), with Louis L. Jaffe, Standing
Again, 84 HARV. L. REv. 633 (1971) (arguing against the test).
231. See 3 DAvIS & PIERCE, supra note 1, § 16.9.

232. 479 U.S. 388, 396 (1987); see also supra text accompanying notes 104-06
(discussing case).
233. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399-400.
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that the plaintiff had standing.' In its 1991 opinion in Air Courier
Conference, 5 however, a six-Justice majority held that a court must
use the much more demanding method of searching for affirmative
evidence "as to Congress' intent ...in order to determine whether
[plaintiffs' interests] were meant to be within the zone of interests
protected."'11 6 Finding no such evidence, the majority concluded that
s
the plaintiff lacked standing P 7 Then, in its 1998 opinion in NCUA,.
a five-Justice majority held that lack of evidence of congressional
intent to protect the interests asserted by the plaintiff is "irrelevant"
to application of the test and that courts must use the permissive,
inferential method of applying the test. 9 The Court did not overrule
Clarke in Air Courier Conference, nor did it overrule Air Courier
Conference in NCUA. Instead, the Court discussed each of its prior
opinions as if each was still good law. The majority in each case
engaged in an unconvincing and unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the
obviously inconsistent precedents.24
It is easy to predict what will happen if the Court leaves the zone
of interests test in its present state. In a high proportion of cases,
each judge will choose which putatively binding precedent to apply,
depending on which method of applying the test will produce a result
consistent with the judge's ideological preferences.2 4' If the judge
wants to give parties with the plaintiff's interests access to the courts,
he will rely on NCUA and Clarke and distinguish Air Courier
Conference. If he wants to deny the plaintiffs access to the courts, he
will rely on Air Courier Conference and distinguish NCUA and
Clarke.
The most important reform the Court can make with respect to
the zone of interests test is to maintain consistency in its method of
describing and applying the test. Either of the methods the Court has
chosen in the past is defensible, but the Court cannot continue to
vacillate between the two if it wants to restore standing to a position
in the world of law rather than to retain its present status as a branch
of politics implemented by unelected, life-tenured judges. The choice
between the methods of applying the test requires more detailed

234. See idat 399.

235. See supratext accompanying notes 78-82 (discussing case).
236. Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 524-25.
237. See iL at 525-26.

238.
239.
240.
241.

See supra text accompanying notes 83-89 (discussing case).
NCUA, 118 S. Ct. at 937.
See id. at 938; Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 528-29.
See supratext accompanying notes 110-25.
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discussion of the two competing methods.
The majority and
dissenting opinions in NCUA provide a good starting point for such a
discussion.
The case arose when the National Credit Union Administration
("NCUA") adopted and applied a new interpretation of the
"common bond" provision, of the Federal Credit Union Act
("FCUA").2 42 The new interpretation would have allowed credit
unions to become much larger and to enroll many new members that
previously relied exclusively on banks to provide financial services.
Banks sought the opportunity to argue that the new interpretation of
the statute was inconsistent with its language. The banks obviously
would further their interests in reducing competition from credit
unions if they were successful in persuading a court that NCUA's
interpretation was inconsistent with the common bond provision of
FCUA. That was enough to convince the majority that the banks'
interest was within the zone of interests arguably protected by the
common bond provision of the statute.243 The dissent would have
required more. Specifically, it would have required evidence that
Congress actually intended to protect banks' interests in reducing the
potential effects of competition from credit unions when it enacted
FCUA.2 4 Finding no such evidence, the dissent would have held that
the banks' interest was not within the "zone." The permissive,
inferential approach adopted by the majority in NCUA is preferable
to the more demanding, specific-evidence-of-intent approach taken
by the dissent, both because the majority's approach provides a better
fit with the realities of the legislative process and because it provides
a better fit with the institutional limitations of courts.
1. The Legislative Process
When Congress considers enactment of any statute, an army of
lobbyists descends upon it in an effort to shape the legislation. In the
typical case, every interest group that is potentially affected in some
significant way by any potential variant of the bill under consideration
is represented in the legislative process. Moreover, unless an interest
group has chosen to retain utterly incompetent lobbyists, it will have
some effect on the shape of the statute-it will be responsible for the
addition of a provision here or the change of a word there.2 45 In the

242243.
244.
245.

See NCUA, 118 S. Ct. at 931 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (1994)).
See iL at 935-36.
See id at 945 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See Pierce, supra note 181, at 1244-47, 1282-84.
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vast majority of circumstances, it is fair to draw the inference that
Congress crafted the statute in an effort to protect all potentially
affected interests to some extent and in some ways. Thus, for
instance, if a statute includes a provision, like the "common bond"
provision, that has the effect of limiting the ability of credit unions to
compete with banks, it is entirely fair and appropriate to infer that
banks played a role in ensuring that the provision was included in the
statute and, hence, that the statute was intended to protect the
interests of banks.
It is certainly possible that the process through which FCUA was
enacted was aberrational, in the sense that banks did not play any
role in that legislative process even though their interests obviously
would be affected by enactment of the statute and by the manner in
which the statute was drafted. The dissenting Justices referred to the
legislative history of the statute in an attempt to prove that Congress
did not intend to protect banks. I have not put in the hundreds of
hours of research necessary to form an opinion on that issue of fact.
Congress enacted FCUA in 1934 at a time when banks' political clout
was at an extraordinarily low ebb. 46 Perhaps banks were asleep at
the switch or politically impotent when Congress enacted FCUA. If
so, that legislative process was a true rarity. A court rarely will go
wrong by drawing the inference that a statutory provision that in fact
protects an interest group was intended to have that effect.
2. Determining Legislative Intent
The primary disadvantage of the more demanding, specificevidence-of-intent method of applying the zone of interests test
becomes apparent upon consideration of the institutional limitations
of courts. The language of a statute rarely includes unambiguous
evidence of an intent to protect, or not to protect, the plaintiff's
interests. In most cases, a court must search the legislative history of
the statute to find evidence of an intent one way or the other. This
inquiry presents a problem of principle for Justices who believe that
judicial consideration of legislative history is inappropriate and
illegitimate. Thus, for instance, two of the Justices who joined the
majority opinion in NCUA, including the author of the opinion,
refused to join the portion of the opinion in which the majority relied
on legislative history in an attempt to demonstrate that Congress did
246. See, e.g., Milton Friedman & Anna Jacobsen Schwartz, A MONETARY HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960, at 299-419 (1963) (describing the banking crisis of the
1930s).
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intend to protect the interests of banks.247

Independent of each Justice's principled beliefs with respect to
the legitimacy of judicial reliance on legislative history, all Justices
should be concerned about a purely pragmatic question: How well
can courts interpret legislative history?
Adrian Vermeule's
outstanding article in Stanford Law Review answers that important
question. 48 Vermeule begins by demonstrating that the Court
completely misinterpreted legislative history in Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States,249 the first and most famous case in which the
Court relied on legislative history to determine congressional
intent 0 ° Vermeule goes on to document half a dozen reasons why
courts are poorly positioned to interpret legislative histories."1 He
urges courts to refrain from attempting to do so because they are
likely to come away with an erroneous understanding of legislative
intent in so many cases that their overall accuracy rate in statutory
interpretation cases would be better if they did not attempt to
2z
interpret legislative history in any case.
Vermeule's recommendation applies with particular force in the
context of the zone of interests test. The courts rarely will err if they
simply assume that Congress intended to protect an interest in any
case in which enforcement of the language of a statute has the effect
of protecting an interest1 3 They are highly unlikely to improve their
track record by attempting the daunting task of determining
legislative intent based on their invariably imperfect understanding of
a statute's legislative history.
CONCLUSION

Modern standing law is closer to a part of the political system
than to a part of the legal system. It is characterized by numerous
malleable doctrines and numerous inconsistent precedents. Judges
regularly manipulate the doctrines and rely on selective citation of
precedents to further their own political preferences. Because
modern standing law is entirely a creation of the judicial branch of
247. See NCUA, 118 S. Ct. at 930 (noting that Justice Thomas, author of the opinion,
and Justice Scalia, did not join footnote 6).
248. See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of JudicialCompetence:
The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998).
249. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
250. See Vermeule, supra note 248, at 1839-57.
251. See id. at 1857-85.
252. See id. at 1885-96.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 241-44.
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government, that branch bears sole responsibility for the present sad
state of the law and sole responsibility to reduce the problems
inherent in modem standing law. The Court can accomplish that
important task by implementing a series of doctrinal reforms that
simplify, objectify, enhance the consistency of, and increase judicial
deference to politically accountable institutions. Through such
reforms, the Court can restore the rule of law to the law of standing.
AN OPTIMISTIC POSTSCRIPT
At the end of the 1997 Term, the Court resolved another
standing dispute in a manner that provides cause for optimism. In
Federal Election Commission v. Akins.' a six-Justice majority
rejected Justice Scalia's idiosyncratic and unsupportable version of
standing. The majority also took a large step in the direction of
simplifying the concept of injury-in-fact and rendering it more
consistent with the Constitution.
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 requires any
"political committee" to register with the Federal Election
Commission ("FEC") and to report its contributions to political
candidates. 51 The Act then makes the information reported
accessible to the public.16 The Act authorizes "any person who
believes a violation of this Act ...has occurred" to file a complaint
with the FEC. 7 It further authorizes "any party aggrieved by an
order... dismissing a complaint filed by such party" to obtain judicial
review of that order.25
The plaintiffs in Akins filed a complaint with the FEC in which
they argued that an organization was a "political committee," within
the meaning of the statute.Y9 The FEC dismissed the complaint on
the basis of its determination that the organization was not a
"political committee."' The plaintiffs sought judicial review of that
order. The FEC argued that courts had no jurisdiction to review the
order because the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. 261 The
plaintiffs argued that they suffered a judicially cognizable and
redressable injury-in-fact attributable to the order in their capacity as
254. 118 S.Ct. 1777 (1998).
255. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994).
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See Akins, 118 S.Ct. at 1784..
2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1); see Akins, 118 S.Ct. at 1783.
2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A); see Akins, 118 S.Ct. at 1783.
See Akins, 118 S.Ct. at 1781-82.
See id at 1782-83.
See id at 1783.
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voters: The FEC's determination that the organization was not a
"political committee" deprived them of information about the
organization's campaign contributions that would be valuable to them
in deciding whether to vote for particular candidates.262
The case required the Court to revisit and clarify the confusing
and inconsistent jumble of precedents that purported to describe the
nature of the injury a plaintiff must suffer to have Article III standing.
As the cases cited in both the majority and dissenting opinions
demonstrate, the Court had characterized injuries that do not qualify
as an injury-in-fact in at least four different ways. It had described
them as "abstract," "generalized," "undifferentiated," and "shared in
2 63
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.
Moreover, one of the cases in which the Court used loose language of
this type was arguably directly on point. In United States v.
Richardson,264 the Court held that a taxpayer/voter lacked standing to

rely on the "Statement and Accounts" clause of the Constitution to
compel the CIA to report its expenditures.265
The majority in Akins recognized that the plaintiffs' injury was
"undifferentiated" and "shared in substantially equal measure by all
or a large class of citizens." 2 Yet, the majority held that the injury
was sufficient to support the plaintiffs' standing.267 The majority held
that only "abstract" injuries fall outside the range of injuries a court is
willing to recognize for Article III standing purposes.26 Throughout
the opinion, the majority emphasized a crucial distinction between
Akins and the precedents the government cited to support its
argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The plaintiffs in Akins
were asserting a right that Congress conferred upon them by statute
and that Congress instructed the courts to enforce at the behest of the
plaintiffs. 269 Thus, for instance, the majority distinguished Richardson
as a case in which Congress had enacted a statute in which it
specifically limited the scope of the expenditure information that the
CIA was authorized to report to the public.2 70 By contrast, in Akins
"there is a statute which ... does seek to protect individuals such as

[plaintiffs] from the kind of harm they say they have suffered, that is,
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See id. at 1784.
Id. at 1784-87.
418 U.S. 166 (1974).
See id. at 179-80.
Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1785-86.
See id. at 1787.
Id at 1785-86.
See id.at 1783-84, 1787.
See id. at 1784.
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failing to receive particular information about campaign-related
The majority made it clear that Congress has broad
activities."'
discretion to recognize injuries that courts must vindicate: "We
conclude that.., the... injury at issue ... is sufficiently concrete and

specific such that the fact that it is widely shared does not deprive
Congress of constitutional power to authorize its vindication in the
courts." 72 The majority opinion in Akins is an important first step in
the process of beneficial reform of standing law.273 If the Court can
maintain consistency in its application of the principles announced in
Akins, it can move standing out of the world of judicial politics and
back into the world of the law, at the same time that it returns to an
interpretation of Article Ill that is consistent with the original intent
of the Framers.

271. Id. at 1785.
272 Id. at 1786.
273. See also Clinton v. New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2100 (1998) (adopting a broad
probabilistic approach to determine whether a government action caused a plaintiff injury
and to determine whether a judicial decision is likely to redress that injury in cases in
which Congress has indicated its desire that courts be receptive to judicial challenges to
the legality of the challenged action).
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